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Religious groups can play different roles in an authoritarian context.
(1)
They can strengthen a regime’s political power by actively supporting
its legitimacy, promoting its values, and reinforcing the domination
of ruling institutions; (2) they may complement authoritarian rule by fulfilling
needs and providing services not offered by the state; or they may offer a
counterweight to a regime by promoting alternative values and by seeking
to restrict state authority over society. (3) The complex roles that religious
groups play depend partly on the regime and its capacity to persuade, mon-
itor, and coerce them to follow its lead. It also depends on whether religious
groups see the regime’s priorities as beneficial, accommodating, or, if they
reject the authorities’ agenda, whether they have the capacity to resist dom-
ination and propagate their own values.
One way to investigate the political impact of religious groups is by using
the concept of civil society, which has many competing formulations. (4) One
of the most popular conceptualisations draws on Tocqueville’s thinking and
links civil society to democratisation, as citizens participate voluntarily in
autonomous associations that counterbalance state power. (5) This version
of civil society combines an institutional dimension, in the independence
of organisations that enjoy legal protection from state intervention, with
specific cultural content such that citizen participation cultivates social cap-
ital, the norms and values characteristic of “civil” behaviour. (6) Such a de-
mocratising form of civil society pluralises political power because
organisations in society represent interests to the state, set limits to state
power, and produce behaviour to improve the functioning of state and so-
ciety.
The question of civil society in the religious
context of China
Authoritarian regimes such as the Chinese Communist Party-state do not
recognise any legal framework protecting social organisations. (7) Further,
because many organisations in China mix party-state guidance with societal
initiative, lack full autonomy, and draw near to the state to gain resources,
civil society is often conceptualised as an intermediary sphere of voluntary
associations between state and family with some degree of autonomy from
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the state. (8) Policies require registration for groups to operate openly while
intrusive regime structures may stunt their ability to identify and defend
their interests. (9) First, whether groups defend their interests needs to be in-
vestigated, and organisational autonomy, international media attention, and
the possibility of playing complex institutions against each other (10) can all
help. Second, religious groups may promote alternative values that spur be-
haviour for the common good by providing for weaker or poorer citizens,
or groups may echo political support for the regime agenda. Third, religious
organisations as democratising civil society must have a transformative im-
pact on wider politics. In this article, I view civil society as simply the inter-
mediate associational realm between state and family with some
autonomy, which means most religious groups qualify as civil society. But
to act as a democratising civil society group that undermines authoritarian
rule, a religious group must offer alternative values to the regime’s agenda,
protect the interests of religious institutions against state encroachment,
and limit state authority and power (but not only for its own interests). (11)
The regime’s values centre on its legitimation agenda by which the Chinese
Communist Party-state promotes state-led nationalism, economic develop-
ment, and social stability in a quest to build a prosperous country. (12) The
regime justifies its rule by rallying citizens around a cultural identity as citi-
zens of a Chinese state, boasting of increases in GDP, and asserting power to
maintain domestic peace as China’s national profile rises in the world, leading
to values of wealth and economic development, state-led nationalism, and
party-state power. (13) Officials encourage (or shift) values promoted by reli-
gious and social organisations such that they fall in line with its agenda. (14)
Before delving into the contribution of Protestants to civil society, we gain
a brief lay of the land with an abbreviated sketch of other religious groups,
choosing Buddhism and Daoism/popular religions for two reasons. First, as
the two largest religious populations in the country, they are important for
demographic reasons. Second, unlike Protestants (and Catholics, Muslims,
and Tibetan Buddhists), they do not worship a “world-transcending” deity or
cherish universal principles that would hold secular rulers to account, as
Richard Madsen points out, so they provide a good starting contrast for our
later investigation of Protestant civil society. (15)
Among the official religions, Buddhism counts the largest population of
worshipers in China, with perhaps a hundred million or more participants
and more than 20,000 state-sanctioned Buddhist temples and monaster-
ies. (16) Scholars studying Chinese Buddhist groups find values that appear
to counter the materialistic agenda of the CCP. (17) Older and unemployed
lay Buddhists outside temples in Beijing and elsewhere, for example, circu-
late free Buddhist materials as they make sense of their marginalisation and
reform themselves and the morality of wider Chinese society, which they
see as corrupted by greed. (18) Buddhist sites thus provide alternatives to the
CCP’s economic success and material wealth narrative.
Buddhist temple leaders also demonstrate the capacity to subvert dom-
ination by the party-state. As Yoshiko Ashiwa and David L. Wank have
shown, Buddhists in Xiamen have organised in shifting alliances with na-
tional and local party-state cadres and with Buddhist association leaders
at different levels to play one against the other to defend temple inter-
ests and ward off revenue-hungry local state officials seeking to control
temple income. (19) At the same time, Buddhist leaders act in ways to
complement and even strengthen local authorities’ rule. They have be-
come willing partners in economic development by generating local state
revenue through temple construction projects, by hosting celebrations,
and by setting up tourist attractions for Buddhist adherents, with the
most visible example being the Shaolin Buddhist Temple and its reality
television shows. (20) Buddhist institutions have also begun to complement
the regime by fulfilling social welfare needs by offering healthcare, edu-
cational funding, and homes for the elderly. (21) Ideologically, Buddhist
leaders have declared that “Communism is in accordance with the fun-
damental spirit of Buddhism,” giving such wholehearted support for the
regime and its state-led nationalism that authorities have held them up
as models for all leaders of official religions. (22) As lay adherents left be-
hind by rapid modernisation find spiritual succour and activist temple
leaders demonstrate the ability to defend Buddhist interests, many other
Buddhist leaders show that Buddhist institutions can accommodate,
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complement, and even “strengthen the resilience of [the] current
regime.” (23)
It is difficult to ascertain the number of Daoist and popular religion prac-
titioners, but the number of official Daoist temples doubled to 3,000 in the
14 years from 1995 to 2009. (24) On the one hand, Daoist temples have ben-
efited from the increasing levels of economic development, as tourists have
patronised Daoist sites, and local cadres have realised that Daoist temples
can even draw foreign investment into local public works. (25) On the other
hand, local temple networks and lineage halls have functioned like “China’s
second government” because they offer social and cultural services, build
infrastructure, and enjoy high prestige in areas where local cadres lack re-
sources and have exceeded budgets. (26) This complementary and substitu-
tionary role of Daoism and popular religion for the party-state is evident in
rural areas, but in cities such as Shanghai where the party-state’s institutions
are strong enough to enforce its values on Daoist institutions, the transfor-
mation in religious practices and values is dramatic. (27) There, Shanghai
Daoist Association leaders altered traditional Daoist values from “equality,
moderation, and benevolence” to priestly competition, increased efficiency,
and material wealth. (28) Priests attended classes to gain an “entrepreneur[ial]
spirit,” and their wages were tied to ritual performances, as customary val-
ues such as “staying with poverty and enjoying the Way” were replaced with
new commercial tenets, such that young priests began to call one another
“boss (laoban)” rather than “senior fellow Daoist (daozhang).” (29) Overall,
like Buddhism, Daoism’s relationship with the state exhibits a complemen-
tary as well as a predatory dimension. (30)
This brief glance across Buddhist and Daoist religious groups, though in
no way meant to capture the full diversity of religious expression or inter-
action, shows remarkable variety in the types of relationships that exist be-
tween these groups and state authorities. Even so, it is clear that they
operate far more often in ways that are complementary to, or even substi-
tute for, the regime than they do in ways that are conflictual (or that restrict
the party-state).
Protestant groups, by contrast, are an important case study for civil soci-
ety’s development in China’s religious realm for three reasons. First, Protes-
tant churches in China early on claimed independence from the state and
provided the model for the state’s institutionalisation of religion in twenti-
eth-century China. (31) To the extent that other religions evolve along the
lines of Protestantism, study of its development may hold lessons for their
future changes. Second, the separation of religion, specifically of Protestant
churches, from political power in feudal Europe was instrumental in the his-
torical development of civil society in Western European countries. (32) Third,
in the twentieth century in Europe, Protestant (and Catholic) churches
played key roles in mobilising groups in civil society that triggered the
downfall of Eastern European Leninist regimes. (33) If Christian churches else-
where helped promote autonomous, critical forms of civil society and has-
tened the demise of Communist regimes, they should be studied in China.
Yet in order to grasp how Protestant Christian groups might challenge (or
complement) regime power in particular, we will need to take a closer look
at the overall regime ideology, structures, and policies on religion.
This essay draws primarily on nearly 40 interviews I conducted between
2009 and 2010 during five months of fieldwork among Protestant leaders
and members of the Three Self Patriotic Movement and Christian Council as-
sociations (or TSPM/CC), provincial and regional seminaries, and official
churches as well as in unregistered churches. Because interviewees were de-
veloped through snowball sampling, the data are not meant to be statistically
representative of the Chinese Protestant churches although they do come
from a range of urban areas (cities, provincial capitals, and Beijing) and
provinces (south-eastern coastal areas, the central region, and the North-
east). I also draw upon guides to religious affairs issues, cadre training hand-
books, and research conducted by Chinese scholars. I refer to “official
churches” that are registered with the state and affiliated with the TSPM as-
sociation because they have official authorisation and are staffed by leaders
trained (or at least approved) by the TSPM, whereas because not all Protes-
tant “house” churches meet in private homes, I use the broader term “un-
registered churches” to encompass congregations that meet in rented office
space and to emphasise that these churches lack formal state approval.
The Chinese Communist Party-state and
Protestant Christianity
I have suggested that democratising forms of civil society that undermine
regime power should offer alternative values, defend institutional interests,
and limit state authority. Hence we must begin by asking how the Chinese
Communist Party-state seeks to impose its own values, override particular
interests, and pursue and maintain unrestricted authority.
Richard Madsen offers a helpful starting point in his concept of “neo-im-
perial sacral hegemony,” which links the Chinese state’s historical claim to
sacred status and unbounded authority over religion to its contemporary
self-understanding as a ruling party that guides and authorises society’s de-
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velopment. (34) Historically, the Chinese state, whether in its imperial, Re-
publican, or Communist periods, has held itself as the supreme authority
above all religious actors. (35) Drawing on Xi Jinping’s 2008 declaration that
the Party was now a “ruling party,” Madsen argues that the CCP sees itself
as carrying out a sacred national mission, part of which is to promote par-
ticular values to develop the economy, defend the motherland, and promote
its “cultural heritage.” (36) In these values, the party-state therefore continues
to claim the imperial dynastic state’s sacred aura and dominant authority
over society.
Setting off from Madsen’s idea of “neo-imperial sacral hegemony,” we’ll
analyse the values that have particular impact in the religious realm, as they
take shape through the party-state’s corporatist structures, its ideology of
state-led nationalism above religious faith, and evolving policies toward re-
ligion’s engagement in societal issues.
First, shortly after taking power in 1949, the CCP supported collabora-
tionist religious leaders to set up national associations for Protestant Chris-
tianity and the other four official religions (Buddhism, Catholicism, Daoism,
and Islam), under which all religious sites had to affiliate or be shuttered. (37)
Because CCP historiography links closely the Christian churches and foreign
imperialism, the Protestant and Catholic associations were also required to
include “patriotic” in their names, signifying their questionable loyalty to
the CCP. (38) Today, the same corporatist structures persist, with this hierarchy
of religious associations and two major organs of the party and state all
overseeing the official religions. The party bureaucracy comprises the United
Front Work Department (UFWD), which wields the greatest influence in re-
ligious affairs and deals with religious leaders individually, while the state
organs are the national-level State Administration of Religious Affairs (SARA)
and local offices of the Religious Affairs Bureaus (RAB), which take charge
of day-to-day monitoring of religious affairs. (39) All religious sites and per-
sonnel must register with the state and affiliate with their respective asso-
ciations, so that official Protestant churches fall under the authority of the
Three Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM) association and its sister organisa-
tion, the Christian Council (CC). (40) The associations in turn are integrated
into the party-state structure, because the regime sanctions and legitimises
the associations, appoints their leaders, and claims to protect “normal” re-
ligious expression by eradicating groups that lack state-granted legiti-
macy. (41) Although the CCP no longer regularly exercises the same coercive
power to impose control through its various institutions as in the Mao era,
the structures nonetheless ensure that Protestants in official churches wor-
ship within the public framework of regime authority over society.
Second, in addition to the organisational structures of domination over
religion, the CCP has also endeavoured to shape the values and beliefs of
religious leaders and adherents within those structures in line with its ide-
ological agenda. According to the Constitution, the CCP views religious be-
lievers as outside of its (secular) definition of the nation, but allows them
an avenue to join the nation by supporting the leadership of the CCP as
part of their “love of country” or patriotism. (42) To inculcate this patriotism
centred on the CCP among rising Protestant leaders, official Protestant sem-
inaries promote the slogan and coursework for the “mutual adaptation of
religion to socialist society” in patriotic education classes, for which national
government offices have developed standard textbooks. (43) The goal is to
minimise differences between non-believers and religious believers such
that all Chinese unify politically under the leadership of the CCP.
Some scholars view the CCP’s structuring of religion through organisation
and ideology as largely “creating the discursive framework” (44) for interac-
tions by cadres and religious leaders and others, although I suggest that this
underplays the power differential between state actors and religious leaders
and the party-state’s power to determine which actors legitimately belong
in the public realm of society. Certainly, the reform-era party-state does not
forcefully impose its religion policies as the Mao-era regime did. (45) And, in
the reform era, the party-state does rely more on persuasion than coercion
to manage religious affairs. (46)Yet, as Madsen’s neo-hegemony suggests, the
party-state still asserts supreme authority and reserves the exercise of co-
ercive power when necessary to supplement its powers of persuasion, so
that even if the power imbalance has lessened between cadres and religious
leaders, it is certainly still present.
As a result, Protestant associations and their leaders play a more central
role than before, because cadres from the regime’s institutions for moni-
toring and containing Protestants’ activities hold little religious legitimacy
or persuasive power for Protestants. According to the director of the national
State Administration of Religious Affairs, association leaders have such in-
fluence and status that they can “play a role that the party-state cannot”
among believers. (47) Of course, the dominant party-state is not monolithic;
rather it is highly fragmented and varies in efficacy from area to area. The
TSPM/CC associations therefore exhibit considerable variation in their ca-
pacity or desire to monitor and restrain grassroots official church activities.
On one end, powerful, activist TSPM/CC associations, as in Harbin, weaken
pastor-believer ties by restricting grassroots pastors’ time with congrega-
tions by controlling church committees, reassign popular pastors from key
churches to outlying churches (to avoid challenges to associational leaders’
46 c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s •  N o . 2 0 1 2 / 3
34. Richard Madsen, “Back to the Future: Pre-modern Religious Policy in Post-Secular China,” art. cit.
35. Anthony C. Yu, State and Religion in China, Chicago, Open Court, 2005; Goossaert and Palmer
also note that the state-sponsored push to shape popular morality has not ended in the post-
Mao era, but has only taken different shape. Vincent Goossaert and David A. Palmer, The Religious
Question in Modern China, University of Chicago, 2011, p. 194.
36. Richard Madsen, “Back to the Future: Pre-modern Religious Policy in Post-Secular China,” art. cit.
37. Richard C. Bush, Religion in Communist China, New York, Abingdon Press, 1970.
38. And only in the mass campaigns that accompanied the lead-up to China’s entry into the Korean
War did increasing numbers of Protestants sign on to support the new associational structures
under CCP authority.
39. Alan Hunter and Kim-Kwong Chan, Protestantism in Contemporary China, New York, Cambridge
University Press, 1993.
40. Kenneth G. Lieberthal et al. (eds.), Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China,
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1992. As Kindopp notes, the Christian Council was originally
intended to replace the TSPM because the TSPM’s reputation was so tarnished in the eyes of many
Protestants by its harassment of Protestants in the Mao era. Jason Kindopp, “The Politics of Protes-
tantism in Contemporary China: State Control, Civil Society, and Social Movement in a Single
Party-State,” Ph.D. Dissertation, George Washington University, 2004.
41. On co-optation of religious and social organisations through state corporatism, see Mary E. Gal-
lagher, “The Limits of Civil Society in a Late Leninist State,” in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Civil Society
and Political Change in Asia, op. cit., pp. 419-452. On state control of Protestants, see Carsten T.
Vala, “Pathways to the Pulpit: Leadership Training in ‘Patriotic’ and Unregistered Chinese Protestant
Churches Leaders,” in Yoshiko Ashiwa and David Wank (eds.), Making Religion, Making the State,
op. cit., pp. 126-150. Thanks to Roskilde University professor Lisbet Christoffersen for pointing out
that state churches also can be sources of civil society.
42. Ryan Dunch, “Christianity and ‘Adaptation to Socialism’,” op. cit., p. 163; Yingjie Guo, Cultural Na-
tionalism in Contemporary China, op. cit., p. 42; Carsten T. Vala, "Protestant Reactions to the Na-
tionalism Agenda in Contemporary China," in Francis K.G. Lim, Christianity in Contemporary China,
Socio-cultural Perspectives, New York, Routledge, 2012.
43. Ibid. For the patriotic education textbooks, see Cheng-tian Kuo, “Chinese Religious Reform,” Asian
Survey, vol. 51, no. 6, 2011, pp. 1042-64.
44. David A. Palmer, “China’s Religious Danwei,” art. cit., p. 21; Vincent Goossaert and David A. Palmer,
The Religious Question in Modern China, op. cit., p. 321.
45. Tibetan Buddhists and Uyghur Muslims have a different perspective on the reform-era regime’s actions.
46. Nanlai Cao, Constructing China’s Jerusalem: Christians, Power, and Place in Contemporary Wen-
zhou, Stanford University Press, 2010, p. 7.
47. Wang Zuo’an, Zhongguo de zongjiao wenti he zongjiao zhengce (The religious issues and religious
policies of China), Beijing, Zongjiao wenhua chubanshe, p. 314.
Special feature
authority), and refuse to ordain aspiring pastors they deem to be “untrust-
worthy.” (48) At the other end, grassroots official church leaders have reported
remarkable autonomy under weak TSPM/CC associations in places such as
Changchun, where they spend much time with congregants modelling hum-
ble leadership, launch illegal domestic missionary teams to remote
provinces, and preach and teach exactly as they see fit. (49) (Outside of im-
portant political centres such as these provincial capitals, Protestants report
some associations to be ineffectual or even non-existent in the daily life of
grassroots official churches. (50))
Similarly, although the party-state’s call for the “mutual adaptation of re-
ligion and socialist society” signals the regime’s power to direct in broad
strokes Protestant teachings, the actual details are worked out in uneven
fashion in various official Protestant seminaries. TSPM pastors have reported
fuller implementation of its Protestant expression as “Theological Recon-
struction” in seminaries under top TSPM/CC leaders’ control, while it has
been undermined or resisted in much of the rest of the country. (51) Ryan
Dunch characterises the “Theological Reconstruction” push as part of a “long
conversation” with Protestant leaders. (52) Yet whether the party-state sets
the framework or is in some form of dialogue with Protestant leaders over
its religious management, it is still, to carry the metaphor to its breaking
point, the CCP that decides when to start, stop, and interrupt the dialogue.
An unequal (and at least potentially coercive) relationship exists between
party-state cadres and Protestant association leaders on one side and grass-
roots official church leaders and adherents on the other. (53)
This more moderate but still lopsided power relationship takes yet another
form in the religion policies of the last several decades. After the Cultural
Revolution ended, the CCP issued Document 19 in 1982 to reverse its policy
of religion suppression while reaffirming that religions would disappear once
material conditions improved. (54) Local and provincial levels of government
then promulgated increasingly more (and longer) religion regulations in the
aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, partly as an attempt
to bring religious affairs under regulatory control and partly to grant its con-
trol a degree of legal legitimacy. (55) This regulatory push culminated in the
2004 Regulation on Religious Affairs, called a “paradigm shift” by officials
for its (largely unrealised) promises to limit bureaucratic abuse of power
and ease direct registration of churches with the state. (56) These regulations
utilise language so imprecise and definitions so vague that local cadres con-
tinue to enjoy great leeway and few constraints in dealing with religious af-
fairs. (57) However, one area in which religious affairs cadres enthusiastically
embraced religious initiatives was in tourism and the provision of charitable
services, such as funding indigent student scholarships, providing elder care,
and setting up medical clinics. Religious groups launched into these activi-
ties after President Hu Jintao announced during the 17th Chinese Communist
Party Congress in 2007 that religious believers could play a “positive role…
in promoting economic and social development.” (58) Religions were free to
play a helping role for the party-state.
Protestants and democratising civil society
Regardless of the extent to which the party-state since the early 1980s
has modified its structures over Chinese Protestant churches (very little),
lessened its ambition to alter Protestant doctrines and practices (some),
and improved its regulations towards churches (more, even if actual results
vary), the question remains whether Protestant churches act as sites of
democratic civil society. According to our working definition, Protestant
churches must offer alternative values, defend institutional interests, and
limit state power. The question is important not only because of the his-
torical and comparative reasons given earlier. Protestants also constitute a
rapidly growing portion of the population, and thus are a source of worry
for CCP cadres who fear their disloyalty. By official count, which tallies only
those aged 18 or older and who worship in officially registered sites, Protes-
tant numbers exploded from three million in 1982 to 15 million in 1999. (59)
Contemporary estimates of the number of all Protestants in official and un-
registered venues range widely, with overseas journalists’ estimates running
as high as 100 million, (60) while more conservative estimates suggest 40
million to 60 million Chinese Protestants. (61) Whatever the precise numbers,
the warning of top CCP officials echoes those in Protestant seminary text-
books about the “foreign enemy forces” that seek to “destroy the socialist
motherland,” while scholars at the Central Party School in Beijing blamed
Eastern European churches for being instruments of “Western enemy forces”
to spur the collapse of Communist regimes. (62)
I begin by exploring the question of Protestants and civil society in the
setting of the official churches, seminaries, and TSPM/CC associations, and
then turn to Protestants worshiping in unregistered churches. (63)
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One way to assess the capacity of official Protestant churches to play the
role of democratising civil society organisations is to interview Protestant
TSPM/CC association leaders (such as TSPM chairpersons or CC directors),
seminary officials (such as principals and vice principals), or grassroots
church leaders, because they serve in key roles between adherents and the
state and because RAB officials frequently rely on them as the front line in
keeping track of Protestant activities. (64)
The attitudes of such Protestant leaders toward state power offer insights
into whether they have been fully co-opted or whether they retain a critical
perspective such that the various state-sanctioned Protestant institutions
under their watch might act as spaces of civil society. Asked a broad ques-
tion about the degree of religious freedom for Protestants, these Protestant
leaders tended to highlight the improvement in the regime’s treatment of
religion.
A provincial CC leader in southern China launched into a historical overview
of the CCP’s steadily more benign view of religion, starting from its original
perspective of religion as the “opium of the masses” (in the 1980s), to dis-
cussions of “religious freedom” (1997 15th Chinese Communist Party Con-
gress), religion “harmonising” with socialism (the 2002 16th Party Congress),
and finally religion as “a reliable force to build Chinese socialism” (the 2007
17th Party Congress). (65) A north-eastern TSPM/CC city leader proudly noted
that the CCP had inserted the phrase “policy of freedom of religious belief”
into its 2007 constitution, which led to his sunny view that religious freedom
is “continually improving, without a doubt…and becoming complete.” (66)
Older Protestant TSPM and CC association officials tepidly contrasted the
Mao era and today’s circumstances as evidence for optimism, perhaps be-
cause their traumatic experiences under Mao made them appreciate the
contemporary situation. A TSPM/CC director in a small city pointed out that
at least the government now permitted Christians to worship publicly. (67)
Further, he viewed the state’s promotion of “patriotic” education, which
others might see as sacrificing religious faith to party-focused political loy-
alty, as a positive change because the regime replaced the violence of earlier
times with persuasion. (68)
As the provincial CC leader in southern China pointed out, “Before, the
Party looked at religion as oppositional, [but] now religion is a part of soci-
ety.” (69) As an officially sanctioned part of society, Protestants are called
upon by the regime to play important roles in meeting societal needs, as
President Hu Jintao’s 2007 announcement shows. Protestant leaders are
eager to do so, yet they complain that they often lack the resources they
need. (70) In this context, some official church pastors and leaders go so far
as to see the regime as benefitting churches that “need the government’s
help” by offering the party-state’s resources and recognition in society, help
without which churches would have a “hard time participating in society.” (71)
Such Protestants view the regime not as suppressing Protestant churches,
as many overseas observers assume, but rather as empowering them.
So far, leaders in the Protestant TSPM/CC associations, seminaries, and
churches express willingness to cooperate with the party-state, suggesting
that, at least from a leadership view of these Protestant institutions, they
appear to play a complementary role as civil society. Official Protestant in-
stitutions do not seem to offer alternative or critical values or seek to set
limits to state power.
Yet, just because Protestant leaders express agreeable attitudes does not
mean that they do not defend institutional interests when necessary. Of
course, Protestant leaders do at times argue that Christians need to accom-
modate to the existing order and could cite Biblical texts for support. For
example, the southern China provincial CC director explained that Protes-
tants were better off adapting “according to local circumstances” than tak-
ing oppositional stances, because “Jesus…said, ‘Give to Caesar what is
Caesar’s, to God what is God’s.’ He didn’t directly make the government
lose face…or develop a conflict with the government.” (72) Yet, at the same
time, more than one savvy TSPM/CC leader made clear that avoiding open
conflict did not translate into abject subordination to the regime either.
These TSPM/CC leaders or pastors mentioned Jesus’s words in the Bible to
be “cunning as serpents, innocent as doves,” pointing out that being savvy
in dealing with authorities was much better than expressing naïve opposi-
tion to disagreeable policies. (73)
In fact, rather than articulating conflicting interests in a direct manner, of-
ficial church leaders have manoeuvred around restrictions put in place by
the party-state, but in ways that limited the impact on building up norms of
democratising civil society. One small city TSPM/CC director learned that his
mayor would soon grant long-term land rights to a work unit that was oc-
cupying church real estate. (74) He skilfully instructed church staff to threaten
street demonstrations by the whole congregation (while to religious affairs
officials, he claimed to be unable to stop them) and eventually managed to
pry government support for a new church building to be built elsewhere. All
this took place without ordinary congregants being involved. An official
provincial seminary staff member explained that her Protestant school was
replacing state-required political content in the “Theological Reconstruction”
curriculum with Protestant teaching that strengthened students’ loyalty to
church interests. (75) A provincial seminary leader in a third location led a
group of students to storm a church taken over by another state office, even-
tually paving the way for the TSPM to regain the real estate. (76) Finally, a
TSPM/CC Protestant staff worker in a small city circumvented regulations
banning evangelism by ignoring local authorities’ warnings and growing ille-
gal meetings to 100 new believers before registering them as new, official
church congregations. (77) In this way, he made use of his employment in the
official association and expanded the number of official churches despite
policies forbidding unregistered meetings. In the face of party-state restric-
tions, Protestant leaders devise ways to pursue their religious goals without
revealing strategies to (or involving) common churchgoers.
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Hence, leaders in the Protestant associations, official seminaries, and reg-
istered churches may express cooperative attitudes toward the regime, re-
flecting their status as state appointees in regime-recognised institutions,
but at the same time reserve their capacity to outflank the authorities to
defend church interests. Some Protestant association officials openly ex-
press satisfaction over the change in the party-state’s accommodation of
religion over the years, and a few Protestants even see the regime as ben-
eficial to Protestantism because it provides resources or recognition for
church work. Still, however much they appreciate the party-state’s moder-
ated stance on religion, some of these Protestants also forge savvy strategies
to manoeuvre around or battle authorities to expand and protect Protestant
interests, much like the Xiamen Buddhists studied by Ashiwa and Wank.
In spite of Protestant leaders playing complementary roles in some as-
pects of their relationship to the party-state, by deploying “cunning” strate-
gies they effectively defend and even advance religious interests. Yet,
because much of this strategising and activism occurs within leadership cir-
cles, common believers are left unaware of the church-state tensions and
the ways in which religious leaders must manoeuvre to resist party-state
pressures. The TSPM/CC staff worker who outwitted authorities to found
new congregations concluded that the regime’s ambition is to “allow you
to exist but [it] doesn’t want you to grow.” Such attitudes are usually not
transmitted to congregations, as a TSPM pastor once explained, because the
regime warns religious leaders against divulging what happens within official
church circles. (78) TSPM/CC leaders likely have their own strategic justifica-
tions for limiting wider knowledge in that it lessens their own risk of pun-
ishment and increases chances that regime officials will be willing to
negotiate an outcome rather than view activism as instances of social in-
stability that require force to suppress them. Keeping such information pri-
vate may short-circuit important processes of democratic civil society
development whereby common believers learn to openly discuss issues of
shared concern with religious leaders, followed by joint debate and discus-
sions, after which participants finally settle on the appropriate norms for
limits to party-state power. Without such processes of public discussion,
activism by Protestant leaders may be effective and successful, but it fails
to generate a wider impact and awareness among common believers that
might help reinforce civil society behaviour.
Unregistered Protestant urban churches and
civil society
The tens of millions of Protestants who worship in unregistered churches
may also contribute to a civil society that offers alternative values, defends
church interests, and seeks to limit state authority. These Protestants reject
state registration to form autonomous congregations out of principle or for
pragmatic reasons. Some remember the Mao-era persecution of Christians
by the regime and at the hands of TSPM leaders and refuse to affiliate on
principle. (79) Others are not aware of religion regulations or cannot register
because no TSPM association exists in their area.
Whether they recall Mao-era traumas or not, many “house church” leaders
today view their autonomy as theologically justified because they criticise
the Protestant associations and official churches for collaborating with an
atheist state and therefore compromising doctrinal purity. (80) Unregistered
leaders attack official churches for a variety of reasons: the empty, ritualistic
forms of official church services lack spiritual vitality; (81) preaching on mis-
sions work is forbidden; (82) relationships between church members in official
congregations are shallow; (83) or the state strives to manage and restrict
church activities. (84) As many critics have put it in one way or another, “Their
[TSPM] head is the Communist Party; our head is Jesus Christ.” (85) Overall,
unregistered church leaders have condemned the “false” nature of official
churches for obeying the party-state rather than obeying God. (86)
Membership growth for unregistered churches was most rapid in the coun-
tryside in the early reform period. (87) But as Protestants in urban areas gained
greater theological training, both in official and unofficial seminaries in
China and also abroad, unregistered churches in the cities became better
organised and had access to greater resources than rural congregations
did. (88) As China’s population has become predominantly urban, so has the
Protestant population, and it has become younger, more educated, and bet-
ter internationally connected than before. (89) Duan Qi and Tang Xiaofeng
note that the proportion of university students in Shanghai and Beijing who
are Protestant is three times and eight times greater than the respective
proportion of city residents who are believers. (90)
The unregistered churches in the cities can be divided into several types,
with some led by factory bosses who established congregations in their
workplaces, others that primarily draw migrant workers, and the ones I’m
particularly interested in – those located in major urban centres and whose
congregations comprise high-status, well-educated, and often wealthier Chi-
nese compared to average urban residents. (91)
Some of these urban Protestant leaders have forged a new approach to
establishing unregistered congregations and to regime relations by calling
themselves an “urban church” (chengshi jiaohui), a geographical description
indicating that they see themselves as neither part of the traditional “house
churches” nor as part of the “Three Self” official churches. (92) These urban
churches are unlike house churches in that they don’t meet in small groups
or prize secrecy or unobtrusiveness; they are unlike official churches in that
they refuse to come under Protestant association (TSPM) authority. Instead,
the young Protestant leaders of these urban churches view their congrega-
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tions as the next stage beyond house churches, because they are open
churches that usually welcome officials and police to visit their services;
they are large churches that come together as a single congregation typi-
cally in rented office spaces; and they are unregistered churches. Their open-
ness, size, and lack of registration all increase their capacity to influence
society because they can accept anyone, have a large enough congregation
to constitute a church community, and are not restricted by onerous religion
policies.
Membership in this subset of urban churches is distinct from the urban
churches populated by poorer urban residents or migrant workers, because
the membership of high-status urban churches tends to be populated by
those who have college education (or are university students), high-status
jobs, or important positions in society. In these urban churches, one or two
hundred young professionals from various fields – law, journalism, health-
care, police, university work – most of whom have been Christians for fewer
than five years, congregate in the rented office spaces of these unregistered
congregations, most of which were formed only a few years earlier. Although
these particular urban churches are not as widespread as other types of
urban churches, because there are fewer highly educated Protestants than
migrant workers in cities, yet a few dozen of these urban churches with 100
or more members and open meetings likely exist in Beijing and other cities
such as Guangzhou, Nanjing, Shanghai, Wuhan, and Xi’an. (93)
The most prominent of the high-status urban churches is Beijing’s
Shouwang Church, whose outdoor worship protests against party-state ha-
rassment from 2011 to today have captured the attention of international
media, including The New York Times and Radio France Internationale. (94)
Shouwang Church stands out as an early mover because it formed in the
1990s, grew to a thousand members at its peak, and has maintained its goal
of worship as a single large congregation outside state structures. (95) It also
aims to influence the public, evidence of which is found in the church name,
which means to “stand watch,” and in what leaders explain as its ambition
to be a “city on a hill.”
After a 2005 warning by authorities that it was meeting illegally,
Shouwang Church began to generate sustained party-state scrutiny in 2006.
The church tested the much-touted national Regulation on Religious Affairs
by applying to register directly with the state, matching every provision
without affiliating under the Protestant TSPM/CC associations’ authority. (96)
Not surprisingly, state authorities rejected the registration application and
ratcheted up the pressure on the church in the run-up to the 2008
Olympics.
In May 2008, the Beijing government issued a notice reaffirming a ban on
all illegal religious meetings. That same month, 30 RAB officials and police
barged into a Shouwang Church worship service. (97) State authorities
recorded the names, phone numbers, and ID card information of believers
and began making phone calls to pressure them to leave the church until
the church organised lawyers to instruct members on how to challenge their
callers and stop the harassment. When Shouwang Church members refused
to cave to regime demands, the authorities tried to disband the congrega-
tion in June 2008 by applying pressure on their landlord to force them out.
By October 2009, the mounting pressure on their landlord convinced church
leaders that they could no longer meet in the rented office building. The
next Sunday they organised an outdoor service that would continue con-
gregational worship and also protest publicly against the pressure. Interna-
tional media attention began to grow. (98) On the third Sunday, the day that
US President Barack Obama was due to arrive, tensions reached a peak, and
President Hu Jintao allegedly intervened to prevent an international incident
by guaranteeing an indoor site to which the church could move. (99) Nearly
two years later, the church is still engaged in weekly outdoor worship
protests because the local party-state refuses to allow any Beijing landlord
to rent them space. The church leaders remain under house arrest, and week
after week, dozens of church members are detained (and released) by po-
lice. (100)
Shouwang Church has the highest profile of these high-status urban
churches not only due to its ongoing struggle with the regime. The church
has also since 2007 published a magazine addressing a range of church
management and faith issues, the print edition of which is read by other
urban church leaders, (101) and it has maintained a website through which it
keeps in touch with members, communicates the numbers of outdoor wor-
ship participants detained every Sunday, and at one point even offered its
side of the story when the CCP state media outlet Global Times editorialised
on the church-state conflict. (102)
In terms of democratic civil society, the attempt by Shouwang Church and
other urban churches to alter the church registration policy would likely
spill over to breaking the party-state’s control of societal organisations.
Shouwang Church has been the most active church in defending their in-
terests by attempting registration and launching a series of outdoor worship
service protests, but churches in Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Xi’an have held
similar outdoor worship services in reaction to local authorities’ shuttering
of their meeting sites. Further, Shouwang Church’s efforts received public
support from more than 40 unregistered churches that signed a prayer letter
and nearly 20 pastors who signed a petition asking the National People’s
Congress to resolve the Shouwang Church conflict. (103) Altogether, many of
these urban church leaders seek to replace what one church leader called
the “unreasonable” policies of state corporatism that lead to “strict control
of popular organisations,” with the goal of gaining “greater space for every
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popular group and individual faith, under the protection of the law.” (104)
Although the urban churches’ efforts to carve out autonomy for religious
activity implies destroying the CCP’s structures of domination over society,
church leaders try to avoid actions that authorities might construe as en-
gaging in politics. Shouwang Church has refused to meet with foreign jour-
nalists, because the party-state might cast such interactions as evidence of
“foreign enemy” support or at least foreign interference in internal af-
fairs. (105)Yet leaders of well-known urban churches in Beijing and elsewhere
enjoy powerful foreign Christian connections. Three of the most prominent
church leaders are Korean-Chinese and have travelled to South Korea to
discuss their experiences. Several of them also have strong American ties. (106)
Yet, the urban church pastors shy away from most political acts, preferring
to call Christians to submit to ruling authorities by referring to Biblical texts.
Despite such precautions, the struggle between Shouwang Church and the
authorities prompted a high-level official from the State Administration of
Religious Affairs to question an urban church leader with ties to Shouwang:
“After all, do the [urban] churches oppose the Party?” In the eyes of this of-
ficial, by seeking to alter registration policies by registering directly with the
state (and not under the Protestant associations), urban church leaders are
threatening to unravel the entire party-state structure of domination of so-
ciety, because once churches are granted registration outside corporatist
structures, independent workers’ unions, political parties, and other groups
will soon follow. (107)
A second set of urban churches also has the ambition of influencing so-
ciety, but its leaders take a flexible, conciliatory approach to state interac-
tions reminiscent of the complementary civil society roles played by other
religious groups and by the unregistered Wenzhou urban churches described
by Nanlai Cao. (108) Their leaders also refuse to register churches out of an-
tipathy to the TSPM/CC, and they also seek to influence society by reaching
its elite members. In one central China urban church, a leader said that pro-
fessors, police, and even government officials participate in her congrega-
tion. (109) In the Northeast, a leader set up a worship service in a three-star
hotel with a live worship band to attract high-status urbanites who might
be put off by the plain surroundings, recorded music, and common people
at many unregistered churches. (110)
Unlike the more assertive stance of the first group of urban churches, lead-
ers of these churches focus on religious goals alone rather than explicit pol-
icy changes. The young north-eastern leader explained that in his
interactions with local party-state officials he sought to change their views
of unregistered churches as being “out of control” by showing that they ac-
tually do not seek to establish an “oppositional church.” (111) He therefore
deals “respectfully” with officials, as he puts it, even when he is carrying out
illegal activities, such as notifying them in advance of a Christmas celebra-
tion held in the local Youth Palace. Notification, he took pains to clarify, did
not mean asking permission or registering the activity in any way, but when
authorities asked that he keep the event a “little quiet,” he complied. (112) In
similar terms, the central China unregistered church leader emphasised that
Protestants need to “look at the whole picture, and see things from [offi-
cials’] point of view.” (113) Therefore, when authorities requested that his
church not hold a service on a particular day, they changed their plans to
accommodate the officials because “we can meet on any day.” This flexible,
yielding approach to dealing with authorities contrasts with the assertive,
resolute stance of Shouwang Church and the first set of urban churches.
This second approach aims to make the most of the officials’ more relaxed
stance toward unregistered Protestant churches by winning their under-
standing through mutual respect. “Before we couldn’t chat [with officials],
only get arrested” for illegal evangelism activities, summarised the north-
eastern church leader, whereas now his unregistered churches were not tar-
geted by officials for “attack” but rather had gained “tacit approval.” (114)
Nanlai Cao suggests this state-recognised (but not registered) status part-
way between legal, official churches under TSPM/CC authority and illegal,
unregistered churches is a “third way” to bring churches outside the corpo-
ratist structures into the realm of official management. (115)
Both types of urban churches seek to transform society through religious
activities (and charitable activities), but the first set of open and resolute
churches also seeks policy change that draws a clear distinction between
state and society in line with a liberal-democratic civil society tradition that
differentiates political and religious spheres of action. The second set of
open and flexible churches exercises influence primarily by engaging officials
through personal relations (guanxi) to further religious goals. Compared to
traditional house churches that avoid all official contacts, this engagement
suggests that church leaders have softened their perspective on official
churches, just as the regime has moderated its treatment of unregistered
churches. The north-eastern church leader recognises state interference in
official churches, but he no longer labels them “heretical.” (116) In fact, he
sees decreasing differences between official and unregistered churches and
even downplays distinctions between the two types. Further, his nationwide
church network no longer seeks to persuade church staff to abandon official
churches on account of their “compromised” nature; instead, they are con-
vinced to remain “true” believers so that they can transform official
churches from within, even when Protestant association leaders exert pres-
sure to restrict grassroots church work. (117)
The new perspective held by urban church leaders also results from the
state’s own efforts to bring unregistered congregations under Protestant as-
sociation authority. As the State Administration of Religious Affairs has
pushed to register traditional house churches (the latest push in 2010-
2012 (118)), churches have affiliated with the weak Protestant associations
of some areas and therefore retain considerable autonomy. (119) As one leader
explained:
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I belong to the pure Three Self, approved by the government, but I
do everything myself. I don’t take any salary, no one is sent [from the
party-state] to my church, we preach ourselves, and evangelise on
our own. But I’m still Three Self. (120)
Such congregations, along with unregistered churches seeking public influ-
ence without confrontation, value carrying out religious activities more than
they do resisting party-state control over society. Differences have become
more blurred between registered official churches that are controlled by as-
sociations in the corporatist structures and registered but largely autonomous
churches, but these more autonomous churches retain their ambition to in-
fluence society (and even state officials) by spreading religious values.
What does this analysis of Protestant Christian churches and their regime
interactions tell us about civil society development in China today? First, un-
like the most tightly constrained social organisations such as workers’ unions,
religious organisations of all types have flourished in number as religious
membership has skyrocketed to hundreds of millions of adherents, with fewer
restrictions than some other types of civil society groups face. (121) Second,
and related to the wide diversity of religious groups, they play a range of
roles as civil society groups, often complementary to state power, sometimes
bolstering regime rule, but rarely undermining it. These roles are partly shaped
by the authoritarian political order, which reflects the Chinese Communist
Party’s continuing ambition to legitimise and dominate public expressions
of religion, even if that domination is less (and less often) coercive than be-
fore and allows for much organisational manoeuvring by religious leaders to
defend particular interests under the carapace of the party-state. The shifting
management strategies of the party-state lead to Protestant churches op-
erating on a continuum of state legitimation, from legal registration on one
end to “tacit approval” in the middle, all the way to banning on the other
end. Taking into account the state’s tacit recognition (and the registration of
churches under weak associations), it appears that the formal status of
church registration may no longer indicate much about the orthodoxy or
political loyalty of a congregation in question. Third, as the Protestant pop-
ulation becomes younger, more educated, and wealthier, Protestants are be-
coming more ambitious, resulting in the emergence of a new type of
high-status urban church in major cities nationwide. These churches eschew
the small and secretive format of traditional house churches in favour of
open meetings, large congregations, and unregistered gatherings aimed at
shaping society. Among these high-status urban unregistered churches, lead-
ers of flexible and yielding urban churches exhibit a non-confrontational, “re-
spectful” approach in dealing with party-state cadres, avoid drawing sharp
lines, and appear more willing to accept officials’ restraints while still reserv-
ing room to manoeuvre and continue religious activities in ways not too dis-
similar to those of leaders of other religious groups in China. These flexible
Protestant leaders suggest that nothing inherent in the Protestant church-
state relationship requires confrontation. At the same time, a resolute, more
assertive set of urban church leaders with foreign ties displays characteristics
of democratic civil society that may undermine the political order by de-
fending church activities in ways that challenge church registration policies.
In so doing, these resolute church leaders implicitly seek to limit state au-
thority over religion and, by extension, over all of society. As in the case of
Shouwang Church and other urban churches that hold outdoor worship
protests, Protestant groups in China seek to do more than forge “autonomous
social spaces” based on Buddhist ethics and charitable giving, as others have
noted; (122) they strive to carve out such spaces through public activism that
combines religious worship with protest and defends the priority of religion
over state domination of society. But unlike Eastern European churches,
whose membership encompassed nearly the entire population, whose origins
predated Communist Party formations, and whose histories were unencum-
bered by associations with foreign imperialism, the Chinese Protestant
churches’ activism cannot challenge the regime’s claim to be the bearer of
national identity. (123) Instead, their ongoing public worship protests are fuelled
by a devoted cadre of church members whose actions rivet international
media attention, and constitute a protest against the party-state’s public
domination of religion and society. Whether their efforts will succeed in a
historical division of society from state depends on factors beyond the
Protestant churches themselves.
z Carsten T. Vala is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Loyola 
University Maryland.
4501 N. Charles St., Department of Political Science, Loyola Univer-
sity, Maryland, Baltimore, MD USA 21210 (cvala@loyola.edu).
52 c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s •  N o . 2 0 1 2 / 3
120. Interview, August 2010.
121. The NGO sector has also flourished, while the All China Federation of Trade Unions has little au-
tonomy and is tightly constrained. See Mary E. Gallagher, “The Limits of Civil Society in a Late
Leninist State,” art. cit., pp. 429-431.
122. André Laliberté, et al., “Religious Philanthropy and Chinese Civil Society,” art. cit., p. 150.
123. Maryjane Osa, Solidarity and Contention, op. cit.
Special feature
